Border benefits

The open border must be a major plank of economic and diplomatic relations between India and Nepal

The open border between India and Nepal has been the vantage point of the two countries' trust-based relationship. But a closer look at this border regime shows a lack of impetus in transforming this unique arrangement for the enhancement of trade relations between the two countries, thus leading to a failure of the border regions to tap into the potential of trade activities.

Gains for both

Many places in the Madhubani district in India's north Bihar share boundaries with Nepal. These places offer immense opportunities to maximise trade and civil cooperation. Sadly, Indian authorities have taken a lacklustre approach in helping build roads and rail infrastructure across the border in Nepal.

Kathmandu, too, has surprisingly failed to show interest. Nepal has no rail network beyond a symbolic and outdated small stretch between Jaynagar in Madhubani and Janakpur in Dhanusha district in Nepal. Telecom and postal cooperation, which has great potential to foster civic ties, is also missing.

These shortcomings indicate a flawed approach to border talks between the two countries. There seems to be a clear and sharp disdain for tapping economic opportunities and while delving on this issue, the geographical spread has to go further—to other parts of north Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Uttarakhand.

The federal structure of India restricts the states' authority and action when it comes to international matters. So it is imperative that New Delhi and Kathmandu be serious about these issues, which are currently being handled half-heartedly without any vision. It is time for India and Nepal to go beyond formal barriers and translate rhetoric into action.

Nepal has emerged as a more confident nation amidst the democratic transition. Nepalis today no longer see the monarchy as an option. This is a welcome development in the country, where, until recently, political authority was seen as inseparable from the royalty. Historic political upturns have tested the country in many ways. But amidst many setbacks, Nepal has emerged as a forward-looking modern nation. These developments have close bearing on Nepal's relations with India.

Potential gains

Yet, in recent years most high-level Nepali delegations visiting Delhi have been ignoring the potential of trade relations between the two countries. It is surprising when even a prime minister-led delegation prioritises rudimentary concerns over core issues.

Take as an example the fact that India is the world's largest milk producer. It reached this position through early adaptation of technology and impressive cooperative movements, not through keeping high numbers of cattle alone. Nepal is a milk deficit country but its plains are conducive for a white revolution. So it should seek India's overall expertise and try to create a success story like that of Amul in Gujarat.

The power sector is another area where the passive stances of both countries are harming their economic interests. There is an immense potential for cooperation—especially in hydroelectric production and transmission. Sadly, India's industrial chambers—the Confederation of Indian Industries, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry and Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India—have not been able to move beyond tokenism in furthering multi-sphere trade cooperation with their counterpart in Nepal—the Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

Most delegations have wasted much time and energy signing Memorandums of Understanding without observing the feasibility of new projects. Treaties between these two countries need immediate revision. Trade or diplomatic negotiations in 2014 cannot be handled by the policies of bygone eras. New Delhi has a lot to do on this regard and it must do so for the mutual interest of both countries.

Border problems

As India faces the constant threat of terror attacks, safeguarding its open border with Nepal is high on its to-do-list. Time and again, Nepal has closely cooperated with Indian security agencies in cracking down on terror outfits, most recently the Indian Mujahideen network. But there are many problems along the border that must be addressed by both sides.

Illegal trade is rampant as official vigilance is not up to the mark. This administrative failure could make Nepal a parking lot for terror activities, as India is the most targeted country by both international and homegrown terror outfits in the whole of South Asia. India cannot afford to overlook this aspect, so it has to guard its borders with greater sensitivity. Nepal also has a shared interest here. The border, therefore, should be made a major plank of India-Nepal diplomatic negotiations.

Next month, a new government will be formed in India. The new prime minister should start a new beginning by visiting Nepal before flying to distant locations. India must show this courtesy to its closest ally, which has not been given its due in the past—especially if we recall the Indian PMs' lack of interest in visiting Kathmandu. That unusual shortcoming has shadowed even the good intentions shown.

To make trade and diplomacy work fairly, India and Nepal should move beyond tokenism and enter a new phase of cooperation. Nepal should not preclude itself of benefiting from India's economic rise and India should not miss the opportunity to further cooperation with a politically stable Nepal.
-Atul K Thakur
Email: summertickets@gmail.com
(Published in The Kathmandu Post on April29,2014)

In praise of new Bihar

Book Review: Non-fiction/The new Bihar: Rekindling Governance and Development by N K Singh and Nicholas Stern (edited), Harper Collins, 387 pp; Rs799 (Hardback)
Among India’s states, Bihar has long been considered something of a ‘political laboratory’, owing to how, during the anti-colonial movement of the 20th century or in the decades post-independence, it had hosted a series of political movements with overarching effects.

Most noticeable among these had been the JP Movement, which resulted in a national emergency, the imposition of which was proof of the intolerance of the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi for a new kind of reactionary politics, led by arch socialist and close friend of Nehru’s, Jay Prakash Narayan.

The movement produced many other leaders over time, including Lalu Prasad Yadav, Nitish Kumar and Ram Vilas Paswan—three individuals who have been at the helm of Bihar’s politics in the post-Mandal Commission era.

In the years between 1990 and 2004, Bihar had dropped alarmingly low on the developmental indices. But change was at hand when the people brought Nitish Kumar and his allies to power. And it’s the immediate impact of that shift, and the policies that made it possible, that the book The New Bihar: Rekindling Governance and Development, edited by NK Singh and Nicholas Stern, deals with. Comprising the input of well-known developmental economists and policy experts, this anthology aims to highlight the Bihar model of development.

In the 1990s, Lalu Prasad Yadav, an early beneficiary of Lohiaite socialism, had made Bihar a ‘governance-free’ entity of sorts. The state had been set on a downhill trajectory then, which was further sped up by Yadav’s conviction in a fodder scam, following which he passed the mantle to his politically clueless wife. In those years, India was growing at an unprecedented pace, but Bihar appeared to be losing out.

Then came Nitish Kumar. Unlike his predecessors, he took major initiatives to improve governance, infrastructure, education, health, power and agriculture—the reason why, in the last six years, Bihar has achieved such accelerated development compared to other states in the country.

In the book, eminent economists like Amartya Sen, Kaushik Basu, Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Meghnad Desai, Shankar Acharya and Arvind Virmani analyse the remarkable turnaround witnessed by Bihar, while policy experts Tarun Das, Deepak Parekh, Lord Billimoria, KV Kamath and Isher Judge Ahluwalia speak of the opportunities and challenges ahead. Most pieces are written in praise of Nitish Kumar, particularly the steps taken in the initial five years of his governance that ensured the functional mainstreaming of the state.

The New Bihar comprises 29 essays altogether. Among these, Sen, who also heads the Nalanda University Project in the state, looks into its distinguished past; Basu, in brief, skims over the fall and rise of Bihar in the last few decades; Acharya, Virmani and Desai discuss the state’s journey to such high economic growth; and Ahluwalia stresses on the importance of urbanisation—although her remarks don’t really seem adequately well-informed regarding Bihar’s ground realities.

Also included is a piece by Swaminathan Anklesaria Aiyar, among the earliest endorsers of Nitish Kumar’s work, who identifies the critical role of leadership in shaping the developmental agenda against the many odds.

We also have Rukmini Banerjee, who follows the grassroots efforts in uplifting education around the country, and her essay incorporates a lively first-hand account of Bihar’s exceptionally well-functioning primary and girl education policies.

All the accomplishments enumerated in this book paint a picture of a state that was in shambles only a few decades ago, not just in terms of infrastructure, but also how firmly it was in the grips of identity politics back then. But Nitish Kumar and his friend Sushil Modi were able to take an almost bankrupt Bihar and turn it into a state of surplus revenue.

Maintaining this momentum, and reaching the next level of inclusive development, however, is a different story, and the book also touches upon what is to come. The Bharatiya Janata Party is no longer with Kumar’s Janata Dal (United), and it appears unlikely that he will be able to return alone after the assembly poll that has been scheduled in 2015.

However, it is certain that he will remain a key political figure in the state, and the legacy he leaves—particularly the notion that good work earns the good will and trust of the masses—will hopefully keep successive governments from straying too far from the development agenda.

Indeed, whatever Kumar and his ilk have done in the first five years of taking over Bihar have been extraordinary to say the least. He is an acclaimed leader, whose celebrity has stretched beyond India’s boundaries as well. Time and again, for instance, he has tried forging an understanding with Nepal on issues concerning the state and adjoining areas beyond the borders.

However, in a federal polity like India, the head of a state has limited say, more so when the centre is ruled by a different political entity. But there is much Nepal could take away from Bihar’s story—for a country that has been grappling with political deadlock for so long, and which has resulted in a sagging developmental track record, the Bihar model offers up a great many suggestions on how to bounce back with an eye on progress.

The book essentially recognises the passion and effectiveness of a doer, who did not take the luxury pass to power. But it’s also careful not to over-glorify, and stresses time and again on the hurdles ahead for the state and others like it.

The majority of the pieces in The New Bihar are engaging and thought provoking, and will no doubt take the Bihar story, and the story of Nitish Kumar—a ‘thinking politician’, as historian Ramachandra Guha was inclined to call him—to wider audiences than ever before.
-Atul K Thakur
Email: summertickets@gmail.com
(Published in The Kathmandu Post on April12,2014)

India’s tryst with democracy

Book Review: Non-fiction/Battles Half Won: India’s Improbable Democracy by Ashutosh Varshney, Penguin, 415 pp; Rs599 (Hardback)

Ashutosh Varshney has long been considered a formidable scholar of South Asian politics and his latest book is a significant addition to his repertoire, particularly at a point in time when Indian politics is undergoing transformations of an unprecedented nature. Battles Half Won: India’s Improbable

Democracy is a compilation of several pieces that seek to trace India’s political trajectory, from the time of its birth to the modern day. What is at the heart of the book is the idea that India is struggling to establish a deeper, more definitive democracy. Varshney has well-captured the centrist tendency in Indian politics, particularly at the national level.

In the states, he says, identities of various sorts still rule the course of political action and outcome. Great use is made of facts and figures to prop up his ideas, testifying to the author’s skill as a truly effective political scientist.
India is presently at a stage wherein the expectations of the electorate are quite diverse, apropos of how the system and its representatives respond to them.

But still we see a Narendra Modi seeking to make his party, his government in Gujarat, and in imagination, the country, an overt extension of his personality. It was the same mistake, in fact, that Indira Gandhi had committed almost four decades ago, making the Congress party her territory.

For a party that had been shaped by a standard democrat like Nehru post-independence, and still carrying some notional attributes of the anti-colonial movement, this had proved a major setback. Varshney emphasises that without the freedom movement, India’s nationhood would have been inconceivable, which means democracy
too would’ve been inconceivable.

He focuses especially on the consolidation of national democracy after 1947, calling it the next remarkable event after India’s independence—where the decisive leadership of Nehru played a major role. It is appreciable that while doling out these analyses, the author is able to keep his personal biases on hold, one of the many strengths of his writing.

The book touches upon, at one point, Mahatma Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj, a radical piece of work. While stressing on Gandhi’s political preferences, Varshney adds, “It is noteworthy that Gandhi himself was not very fond of representative government, his ideal polity was one that had local village republics, more in line with direct, non-representative democracy.” Does this mean then that the Aam Aadmi Party of today is following Gandhian principle?

I suppose that is unlikely, as the AAP, in core, doesn’t oppose representative politics, nor is it its express objective to make representatives accountable. Rather, what the AAP is pursuing is the ‘trivialisation of representation’, visible in the way it has vested the Mohalla Sabha (meetings among residents of a ‘mohalla’, a smaller partition of a ward) with such supreme power.

Given its heavy-handed political maneuverings so far, the party’s plan to contest the general elections in a big way will be much messier, of course. But its strong emergence in the scene has certainly brought democracy under close scrutiny. Varshney offers substantial space in his book for present-day politics, new bases of coalitions, governance and economic reforms—all elaborated upon in his signature style, now become quite popular through the means of his widely read column in the Indian Express.

Like he tends to do in many his opinionated writings in newspapers and academic journals, his book too draws out the differences between the “quality of democracy and existence of democracy.” He envisions India as a mature democracy that has a deeply unstable core, thanks to the socio-economic inequalities and challenges it has encountered with regards to its territorial integrity, making the battle for “deeper democracy” the need of the hour. And the AAP, for Varshney, is an example of the forces within this battle.

For the most part, Battles Half Won analyses the factors behind the deepening of Indian democracy since 1947 and the challenges these have created. The book broadly traces the forging and consolidation of India s “improbable democracy”. The essays delve into themes ranging from caste politics and ethnic conflict, and Hindu nationalism to the north-south economic divide and the politics of economic reform since 1991—issues that have consistently tested the calibre of Indian democracy.

The book also highlights the adverseness of not relying on “intelligent economics”; AAP ideologue Yogendra Yadav, for instance, has made his party’s intentions clear on that by shifting the political and economic agenda away from the “shackle of isms”.

Of course, this is merely in principle so far, and it remains to be seen what the execution will actually be like. But the potential impact of new politics, championed by the AAP—the way it has encroached on the traditional turf of left or right-leaning forces, by injecting flexibility into economic policies and matters of governance—is something that greatly interests our author.

Given the Anna Hazare campaign, which proved so popular a while back, and now with AAP’s swift rise in the power circle, Varshney feels that the bulk of citizens in India are now eager to participate in the overall political process.

While examining all these changes, the book also indicates the next course of development as far as democracy in India is concerned. In Varshney’s view, Indian democracy is the sort that becomes more progressive the more unsettling changes it comes across. After all, time and again, all kinds of political hiccups in India have been solemnised—although with varying degrees of success.

Then again, the stakes are much higher at the moment, and forward-looking Indians can no longer trust a government that offers less than a two-percent job growth rate, for example. Now is the time for political parties to be as prompt in terms of their actions as their electorates are with their expectations. Overlooking that would be detrimental for success in the political fray as other countries in South Asia have evidenced.

Articulate and authoritative, Varshney’s book offers fresh insights into several crucial areas, elements that have shaped India into what it is today, whether that be the complex set of relations under the country’s federal system, the challenges of territorial/cultural diversities, and the contradictory outcomes of economic reforms, among others. Battles Half Won looks back very diligently on successes and failures of India’s tryst with democracy—which despite having many flaws, is charting its course with no full stop.
-Atul K Thakur
Email: summertickets2gmail.com
(Published in The Kathmandu Post on February22,2014)

The Height of Clamour

Book Review: Non-fiction/ A Great Clamour: Encounters with China and its Neighbours by Pankaj Mishra, Penguin, p.325; Rs499 (Hardback)
Pankaj Mishra’s A Great Clamour comprises a significant commentary on contemporary China, an examination of the contradictions and potency that shape and define the country

In the earlier work titled From the Ruins of Empire, Pankaj Mishra had conducted an effective analysis of the western model and presented reasons why he believes Asia has a better chance in the new world, set free as it is from the complex constructs of its colonial past. Mishra’s latest book, A Great Clamour: Encounters with China and its Neighbours, once more, and just as winningly, challenges the burden of western influence on Asia.

In the course of writing these two books, the author has traced the journeys and ideas that contributed to the building of Asian solidarity—first through intellectual engagements and later via trade collaborations. But in the wake of decolonisation and emergence of modern states, based on western political ideas, that solidarity, he believes, has become somewhat incoherent.

Mishra, who calls Mashobra in Himachal Pradesh his home, has intermittently spent over two decades there. Living in such proximity to the mountains, on the other side of which lies Tibet, meant that it was natural that China would figure a big part of his research, a country he deems as complex and possessing a comparable degree of civilisational attributes as his own.

Another factor that threads India and China together, in Mishra’s view, is the role they play in global capitalism. The upward mobilisation from rural areas to big cities is a visible trend in both, with varied internal effects, of course, including the springing forth of a new kind of politics which necessarily focuses on issues related to unequal access to resources and lack of accountability in governance.

But beyond borders, as Mishra puts it, the common experience of modern capitalism offers new grounds for fraternity. Then again, the author does express reasonable concern towards the impediments that continue to exist on the path of solidarity—as in the case of China and India, the contradiction within their respective political systems and economic interests.

The book attempts a frontal attack on capitalism and western notions of modernity; the last part of the volume, for instance, takes into account five other Asian countries—Japan, Taiwan, Mongolia, Malaysia and Indonesia—as sufferers of these very forces.

In doing so, Mishra often seems to be penning a report cart of sorts on these nations, with taglines like “Japan’s aged modernity” and “Shanghai’s garish newness”, among others. As interesting as these are, however, given the fact that he doesn’t list any viable alternatives to replace the western model, they prove a bit aimless in the end.

A Great Clamour can be considered, for the most part, a significant commentary on contemporary China, supported by fine observations on crucial antecedents. Though very briefly, the book also explores the controversial issue of Tibet, as well as the dismal state of Nepali migrants in the booming towns of a “very aggressive China”.

This isn’t, of course, the first time Mishra has touched upon Nepal in his works; his Temptations of the West: How to be Modern in India has a detailed chapter on the country, wherein he captures the sense of disillusionment among the masses incited by both the monarchy and Maoist rule, at a time when royals and radicals were the biggest players in national politics and the path ahead was still murky.

As for the subject of Tibet, it is appreciable that Mishra has chosen to write on it, given how under-covered it still remains in the mainstream press, in terms of real, qualitative research that is built on anything other than a western perspective. Although commentaries and books can be found, there are very few works among these that are able to evade personal judgment to offer a more objective view, something Mishra is clearly hoping to remedy.

The author, who has emerged a major thinker in recent times, further demonstrates his competence with this latest release. In the last few years, Mishra has spent a considerable amount of time in the West, and he’s used the experiences gained therein to challenge the ‘western wisdom’ in circulation around the world, a stance already made crystal clear in his much-hyped spat with Niall Ferguson and Patrick French, during which he accused the first of being racist and the second for overlooking elitism in India.

Mishra’s last two books had aimed to highlight the apathy of Asians towards their own history, and investigate why it is that the western model—ridden with crises of idea and direction—is still being religiously adhered to in Asia. Most likely, he argues, this is because the world has now a more or less undivided economic vision—beyond symbolism, even a country like China is afflicted with the consumerist agenda. The weakening of radical political ideologies and failure of existing leftists to find an alternate route regarding ‘intelligent economics’ has turned the scene dangerously idle, he says.

A Great Clamour largely shows the double-wheeling of the Chinese regime, sans democratic provisions like fundamental rights and transparency. The surging cities, unprecedented aggression on Tibet and calmness of citizens—it’s a country that is expanding with countless contradictions within its belly. But China is a world unto itself; other worlds on the outside have no clear access to this land. And over the decades, it has placed itself in the unique position to be able to play strategic ‘hide and seek’ with entities within and beyond its physical fortress.

India has a rich tradition of wandering scholars, and Mishra appears to be next in line, behind the likes of Rahul Sankrityayan ,Nagarjun, Nirmal Verma, travelling and writing on alien lands. The man, who loves isolation and working outside of the public glare, is greatly suited to unravel the realities of unexplored terrains. Throughout his career, he has been promising with his chosen themes, and this new book too is certain to be read and liked widely.
-Atul K Thakur
Email: summertickets@gmail.com
(Published in The Kathmandu Post on February1,2014)

Verdict for democracy

Nepal’s election results are hardly unexpected. The Maoists have been relegated to third position and many Madheshi and fringe parties have met their diminishing fortunes. Under both the direct vote and Proportional Representation systems, the Nepali Congress, led by Sushil Koirala, took the lead, followed by the CPN-UML, headed by Jhala Nath Khanal.

The political verdict is clearly in favour of a stable coalition. Evidently, the course correction has been directed against the UCPN (Maoist), who failed at any broadbased maneuvering to make the constitution in recent years. The disenchantment with the Maoists, thus, must be seen in the long-term context.

Unprecedented fall

The rise and fall of the Maoists as a political force in Nepal is unprecedented—their acceptance into mainstream society grew with the end of the ‘normal monarchy’ in the country and subsequent political developments, in which the mainstream political parties were on a weak track. Even then, the way in which the Maoists rose to political prominence, despite their notoriety for violence, was quite unusual.

The spectre of decline was certainly known to Pushpa Kamal Dahal and Baburam Bhattarai but they seemed to remain steadfast in not moulding their ideological principle for local conditions and moreover, to live out its spirit. So, the blunders were not single-handed. In the changed scenario, the Nepali Maoists turned into a classic example of adhering to a custom-made ideology from a foreign land.

In the 1960s, something similar happened in India when a genuine radical upsurge met with an awful fate, following the incorrigible sycophancy of communist leaders in fancying the Chinese style of ‘hit and run communism’. Some even went so far to declare ‘China’s Chairman as their Chairman’.

Consequently, the radical movement dwindled in India, though the oppressiveness of the state and corporates has increased multifold over the decades. The Maoists in Nepal should think of the bigger picture and start doing things, rather than denying the aspirations of the common folk. And on a personal front too, they have to show integrity with principled political commitments, which, sadly, is notably absent in their current mode of action.

Albeit, emigration is reaching painful levels of exodus among young Nepalis but the poll results have represented their will. Certainly, they wish for a stable nation, with enough capacity to absorb the needs of every citizen. As of now—from India to Tibet to the Arab countries—the state of average Nepali migrants is a matter of concern for any thinking mind. Alas, no thou-ght or action has really been made on this haunting issue!

NC and UML

This is a historic chance for the Nepali Congress (NC) and CPN-UML to draft a pro-people constitution and create a functional government. As representative of the peoples’ will, these two political parties should not fail this time, because improved democratic processes will only promise better times ahead.

More on the socio-economic line, increased inclusion of different under-represented communities should be among the top agenda. Now these two major political parties have to carry the will of the people at large—as the activism of regional outfits in the Madhes and other parts of the country have lost their allure. But it is crucial for the NC and UML to respond and address the genuine demands of these groups.

Missed opportunity

The election result is remarkable for rejecting the ‘federalisation drive’ of the Maoists but keeping hope alive for socio-economic transformation. This was a response to the previous political configuration, which was largely opportunistic. If things improve, we will not see ethnic conflict mar the syncretism of this ancient land.

As the recently held CA election had existential rigour for Nepal’s democracy, it is truly unfortunate to see India’s inept response. India’s foreign ministry has again missed a chance to do damage control for earlier blunders by offering gestures of support to Nepal, which holds more significance than the other countries where top leaders don’t mind travelling to without reason and wasting valuable national resources.

Still, if not the Indian establishment, the mass of Indians think much more actively about their special neighbour. There lies the strength of bilateral relations between two countries; otherwise, official double standards from both sides could have hampered this relation long ago.

The time is right for immediate action from the new incumbent in Kathmandu. They will have focus on pressing goals. This time, leaders have to act or fail like the Maoists. The choices are easy to make but consistently following up on them will be the real acid test. But for now, reading the election results on a positive note would not be too risky.
-Atul K Thakur
Email: summertickets@gmail.com
(Published in The Kathmandu post,on December07,2013)

The Making of the Mahatma

Book Review: Non-fiction/Gandhi before India by Ramachandra Guha, Penguin/Allen Lane, p.673, Rs899 (Hardback)
When India’s leading historian Ramachandra Guha writes on Mahatma Gandhi, the nation’s father, the account is naturally steeped in the wider discourse. After all, the writer of India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy, one of the most incisive commentaries on India’s tryst with nationhood, certainly has the authority and command to touch upon the main currents of India’s modern history. For over two decades, Guha has brought historiography within his purview, proving to be unprecedentedly receptive to greater social ideas.

On that basis, he has covered the history of cricket, environmentalism and the overall emergence of India as a young nation with old civilisational characteristics. And Guha’s new book, Gandhi Before India, which aims to inquire into and showcase Gandhi’s metamorphosis into the Mahatma over the years, is yet another significant addition to his body of work. Meticulously researched and richly detailed, the book is characteristically humane—a reflection of the fact that Guha has long been a most devoted scholar of Gandhism.

Attempting to explore lesser known facets of the life of Mahatma Gandhi, this first book of a two-part biography project focuses on the time between his birth in Porbandar in 1869 till his departure to India from South Africa in July 1914. “Before I come to the argument about the man, I thought that I should first understand the man. During my research, I realised that virtually everything written on Gandhi was in Gandhi’s own words, all that he said or wrote. I wanted to go beyond Gandhi’s point of view, everything that he wrote on including caste, culture, and religion,” Guha has stated.

The configuration in Gandhi Before India is between India’s greatest man and a scholar. The book’s content proves how majorly Guha has been influenced by the life of Mahatma Gandhi and his worldviews—and there are very few who could’ve penned it in the same spirit. For there have been many an attempt to evaluate the great man, but few have been truly successful—some works oversimplify the narrative while others falter when pushing forth unreasonable doubts.

What is visibly amiss in such cases is an interest in Gandhi’s diversified persona, which is difficult to reject, even in the course of a subversive analysis. Based on archival research in four continents, Gandhi Before India gives an account of Gandhi as an individual and the world he lived in, a world that was apparently constructed of sharp contrasts, such as those witnessed during his movements between the coastal culture of Gujarat to High Victorian London and then to empire-ruled South Africa.

The book is tastefully directed to explore Gandhi’s experiments with dissident cults such as the Tolstoyans and vegetarians, his friendships with radical Jews, devout Christians and Muslims, his enmities and rivalries and his failures as a husband and father.

All these had, after all, contributed to the process of his becoming the man he would forever be known as around the world, a mass mobiliser for the emancipation of humanity. Gandhi’s biggest triumph thereafter was probably his determined reliance on non-violence to fight the brutality of the racist regime in South Africa and the colonial occupation of India.

In the course of time, after plenty of blood, sweat and tears had been shed, the erstwhile colonies became free democracies—and Gandhi’s role also deserves to be seen in the context of his championing of a better western idea.

Although a democrat to the core in action, principally, Gandhi had backed the conception of ‘nation and nationhood’ without sliding from the backup of conventional wisdom. He was part of a vital stream of tradition and modernism. So, as Guha understood it, revisiting Gandhi should take consideration of his personal beliefs as well as his dealings with the world. For he was foremost a man of immense integrity, one who never denied his weaknesses, and who rose to inspire the ethical consciences of millions.

Guha is able to do justice to his chosen theme, depicting Gandhi as simultaneously a fallible man and an unparalleled reformer who changed the entire course of history. The basic contention of the book reasonably notes that Gandhi was not born great but that it was his honest overtures with unusual circumstances in alien lands that had befitted him for the purposes of activism.

He soon emerged a great visionary, a beacon of hope for all the pockets of colonial oppression around the world, one who was intent on sticking to the path of non-violent revolution in order to curtail and diminish the might of imperial power. His approach was not hard-hitting as such, but his conviction and ability to communicate was forthright with effect. A great writer himself, Gandhi linked activism to the pen and peaceful demonstration—a phenomenon shift in the medium of protest in the post-industrialised world.

Guha’s book allows readers to be informed on all counts—including on the many inconvenient truths and misnomers surrounding Gandhi’s legend. Unlike most other attempts, this book does not intend to mystify; it aims instead to make Gandhi accessible to the greater masses, an admirable effort towards what is called the ‘democratisation of historiography’. Gandhi Before India is thus a beautifully written book that will no doubt create anticipation among readers for its sequel. And Guha, reportedly, is already at work on the same.

Even after 66 years of independence, the fog that surrounds Indian history is still quite dense—bizarre given how we’ve had generations of historians who’ve been scrabbling to find the pulse of significant events from the past. Unlike many of them, however, as a free thinker, Guha is probably in a better position to write the new history of modern India, or its ‘social history’. Gandhi Before India pays testament to his skills therein, and his capacity to shape an accessible and engaging narrative with remarkably gathered facts and balanced perspective—quite a rare achievement when it comes to something as complex as India’s history.
-Atul K Thakur
Email:summertickets@gmail.com
(Published in The Kathmandu Post on Novemver30,2013)

Choices to make

As the November 19 election for a second Constituent Assembly (CA) nears, the question is whether the imminent electoral exercise will inevitably cause the political parties to head for more confrontation or if it will outline a strategy of cooperation and co-evolution instead.

The developing political scenario suggests that political parties are sticking more closely with the two contentious issues of the last CA—federalism and the form of government post-election. In the absence of collaboration, it will be tough for the CA to write a well-structured constitution, which is what the country needs.

Since 1990, Nepal’s democracy has been grappling with consistent flip-flops and political maneuverings. It has already lost over two decades in coming out completely from the shadow of royal institutions. The current constitutional crisis would have been unlikely if political principles were in alignment with peoples’ aspirations.

Nepal’s tryst with democracy hasn’t always been painful—the country witnessed full-scale transformation into a ‘democracy’ within a short span of time, compared with other South Asian democracies. The first generation democratic leadership of the country deserves closer evaluation, as they had a clear grasp over their goals and intentions. Sadly, things are dramatically different now.

Nepal has failed to capitalise on many chances to cement its democracy. The eventful 1990s were spent initially in a ‘tug-of-war’ between the king and the political forces, and later in the Maoists v everyone else. The last decade began with an unfortunate royal massacre, which not only ended the monarchy’s natural continuity but also greatly affected the natural progression of democracy.

Since 2001, what has dominated the major political discourse in Nepal should have avoided—intense factionalism, directionless ideological formations and fragmentations, unprecedented rise in regionalism and an excessive focus on the federalisation of the republic. Demands were mostly routed through demonstrations, discarding basic civic and moral sense.

At this crucial juncture, the reckoning should be that Nepal fared well under a central command. It is a small country where territorial divisions are not as important as its emancipation as an economy and democracy. India and China can be the good examples for Nepal, given how far these countries have traveled from medieval monarchies into modern states.

Nepal, however, always has the option to keep the constitution-making exercise simple and inclusive. As a modern parliamentary democracy, it can go the Indian way—where the constitution was made through a rigorous consultation process and by adopting the wisdom/aspirations of the land along with fine examples from outside.

The Indian Constitution, at least notionally, embodies the best of democratic values; and this despite diverse ethnicities and massive size. Whatever the verdict of the election, all political parties should approach constitution-making as a consensus-driven exercise. For this, the trust in the existing parliamentary model needs to be incorrigible. Sans faith in the present system, it will be impossible for the political parties to offer a better alternative to the Nepali people, who are more interested in a dignified life.

Meanwhile, the adamant stand of Mohan Baidya-led CPN-Maoist against the election only proves once again the directionless working of his camp. Baidya should revisit the basics of communism, which teaches that a ‘connect with people’ is supreme. Second, he needs to figure out the constituents of a ‘class structure’ before fighting for the cause of ‘invisible proletariats’. He is about to commit a bigger blunder than his alma mater, the UPCN (Maoist), when recognising the divide between the ‘elite’ and ‘oppressed’.

Baidya’s half-baked political programme may not lead him too far. Earlier too, the Maoists performed miserably on crucial socio-economic as well as cultural matters while they were in power. That was at the cost of a rare political edge, which was post the diminishing status of the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML.

For long, Nepali leaders have not looked at political developments beyond the ‘surrealist order’, which allows ‘unconscious choices to be expressive’. This is an existential downplaying and must not be continued. The Nepali people’s faith in democracy should reflect in its institutions.

Political leaders have to be sensitive to this or they will end-up undermining democracy and finally their own utility in public space. They have to make choices and the poll is going to be most opportune for hat. This election will decide whether democracy in Nepal is a lame duck or a winner.
-Atul K Thakur
Email: summertickets@gmail.com
(Published in The Kathmandu Post on November10,2013)

United against the terrorism

Five years ago, fugitive Indian Mujahideen commander Riyaz Ismail Shahbandri slipped through the India-Nepal border near Madhubani. From there, he undoubtedly continued to safer havens and made sure the Indian Mujahideen would be better trained and more dangerous than ever before.

The recent arrest of high-profile fugitive Siddibapa of the Indian Mujahideen—popularly known as Yasin Bhatkal—from near the Raxaul border in the northern part of Bihar has confirmed that the traditional structure of the India-Nepal border needs drastic changes.

Once, the border areas were known as peaceful regions. But now, more and more terror cells are using the area to cross international borders and plan their attacks. There have been many such cases and the current border security system has been incapable of stopping them from crossing from Nepal into India and vice-versa.

Both in principle and practice, India and Nepal are cooperating to fight terrorism and protect their lands from being misused by rogue elements. Notwithstanding the good intentions of both countries, it is clear that the open border between Nepal and India is being covertly used for passage by terrorists.

Bihar shares a 625 km border with Nepal, of which a long stretch between Jaynagar in Madhubani and Raxaul in East Champaran has been under the scanner of the Indian police since 2006. The complicity of Pappu Khan, Mohamed Khalil, Omar Madani, Ghayur Ahmed Jamali and Ajmal alias Shoaib, in recent terror attacks on Indian cities and the establishment of their activities in northern Bihar districts have justified the police’s attention and call for more of a focus in this region.

The Bihar government has shown resilience in recent years in curbing terrorist activities. The State Government woke up after a joint operation of the Intelligence Bureau and the Delhi Police in October 2005 where these agencies scanned the call details from Madhubani to East Champaran and found an unusually high number of ISD calls to hostile destinations and known terrorist linkages.

India surely appreciates Nepal’s readiness to cope with these challenges and thanks to a joint operation, India was
able to nab a deadly terrorist like Yasin Bhatkal. However, the overall security situation is very complex and the two countries have to deal with it cautiously and on time. Measures need to be taken now, as tomorrow might already
be too late.

We immediately need to end the notion that the open border between India and Nepal poses no security risk. Also, border security has to be up to the mark, which it is currently not. Second, both countries should allow each other to track wanted criminals in their respective territories, thereby making the region unattractive for wrongdoers. Times are getting tougher for India and Nepal due to the rise of international terrorism.

The leaders of both sides must recognise this and they must focus their efforts on fighting terrorism—whilst not neglecting other crucial issues. Nepal is aware of India’s problems with imported as well as homegrown terrorism. Broadly, Nepal cannot afford an unstable India and obviously, a peaceful Nepal is one of India’s main concerns. On the political side, there should be no obstacle for a new security cooperation.

An effective way to deal with cross-border terrorism could be through dialogue on high official levels. Sadly, neither side has taken this issue very seriously in the past. As a consequence, terrorists have been able to move across borders and carry out crimes.

There is, therefore, a crucial need to restructure border security arrangements and build better infrastructure on both sides of the borders. Furthermore, as Indian police are state agencies, Nepal should find a way to involve state governments, who share common concerns along the border, instead of only dealing with New Delhi. Third, the Nepal Police needs a modern upgrade when it comes to interface technology and an increase in the headcount to be deployed near the border.

The Government of Nepal has partnered well with India and if it continues to do so by making its territory safe and
its borders impassable for terrorists, India will be the beneficiary. This strategic response to the activities of non-state terror networks would end their so far successful acquisition of easily accessible resources and pieces of infrastructure.

Until a few years ago, it was unthinkable that terrorists could misuse places like Janakpur or Pokhara to conduct illegal activities against India. The two Indian districts of Madhubani and Darbhanga also suffer from these latest
developments, despite their past intellectual traditions of refined cultural practices and communal harmony.

These two districts are known in official police criminal records as the ‘Madhubani Module’ and ‘Darbhanga Module’ What, then, is fueling the hate-game? Consensus can be attained by looking at some of the most recent terror cases and their link to the districts of north Bihar. There is evidence of local support and—shockingly—most of the culprits ended up as terrorists because they misinterpreted the teachings of Islam.

They have forgotten the shared past and the unbreakable trust which still remains among the different communities of the Mithila region. Neither historical records nor the present situation justifies such misinterpretations. Nevertheless, terror has expanded. It has to be ended and terrorists have to be reformed (those who are willing to be) or wiped out.

There is no reason for us to treat them with kid gloves. India has been suffering greatly from terrorism, although it was only after 9/11 that the world acknowledged India’s pain. India has the capacity to fight terrorism and its determination to do so is unshakable. Nothing could be as helpful at this stage as effective security cooperation between India and Nepal.
-Atul K Thakur
Email: summertickets@gmail.com
(Published in The Kathmandu Post on October06,2013)

Beyond borders

Many multilateral cooperation platforms have eluded smaller nations, contradicting their own rationale for existence. Nepal is no exception to this phenomenon and has badly missed out on chances to carve out a position to deal with major bilateral issues in South Asia and beyond. The country’s long democratic transition has made its standing even more precarious.

Before 2001, Asia had two distinct royalties—Nepal and Bhutan. With the unnatural ending of the partially feudal legal throne in Nepal, the country ushered in a complex web of mismanaged political arrangements. Later, the prominent advent of the Maoists and Madhes-based political parties were in the right spirit of the times but later developments have shown their inefficiency in dealing with the cores of polity and diplomacy.

Living under an unjustified ‘big brother syndrome’ and making impractical moves for trilateral initiatives have broken down Nepal’s conventional edge vis-à-vis its relation with India. Prachanda’s latest visit to New Delhi was primarily seeking Indian confidence for the Chinese presence back home. This was a sort of blunder, though it was surprisingly overlooked by the Indian side.

Nepal’s external policy should be directed by its own self-interest instead of excuses. The political establishment in Kathmandu should reckon that the diplomatic engagements of two almost equals—India and China—do not happen on a single front but on many counts. Among them, the most formidable is economic ties. Li Keqiang’s first foreign trip as prime minister to India was aimed at settling the border dispute and boosting economic ties. Straight after India, he flew to Pakistan, and total results of his visit have proved abysmal.

China cannot simply throw off the burden of its past. It has a few allies to date and Nepal should not have irrational expectations from China. In the lexicon of Nepal’s political economy, trade should be given extra attention. Trade and diplomacy must be the mainstays of external policy. There is no reason why Nepal should distract from this fundamental understanding. The hyped ploy of breaking conventions has given little positive outcome so far. The lack of any political stalwart is another cause
of concern; the country is missing a pacifier like Girija Prasad Koirala like never before.

New efforts are being made to hold Constituent Assembly elections in November, which will be a great test of the political parties en masse as there is great disenchantment among the populace for their false promises. People’s representatives need to come to terms with the fact that the masses are only concerned with leading the country out of the present mess. The internal atmosphere will shape Nepal’s external policy; so clarity over this would do well for the country’s future course.

In South Asia, Nepal is situated strategically to carry forward its independent stature. Despite the gloom and doom over the last two decades, Nepalis in general have endorsed democracy. This is a sort of accomplishment, as modern ideas and aspirations are routed through such welcome changes. If there is balance on the political home turf, it will be much easier for Nepal to claim its deserved position in the world.

There is no tailor-made solution for a firm footing in external matters except for being internally strong while chasing difficult targets externally. Relying less on theoretical paradigms and taking a more practical approach would make foreign policy maneuvering a more informed exercise. As a sovereign state, the boldness of Nepal’s action should display its sovereignty. Unlike China or India, it has never earned the ire of cunning colonial motives. This is a reality and not bound to be changed.Thus, it allows Nepalis to take pride in its non-interfering nationalistic pedigree.

In the present ideal-deficient time, bilateralism is the order of the day for nations. Hence, Nepal too should define its priorities accordingly. Among the most important changes, it should learn to look beyond India and China as the world is much bigger. With a changed mindset and a mature leadership, Nepal has the capacity to draw resources from beyond.

However, India will stay its closest ally, even when Nepal expands its presence across the globe. China has a different angle on seeing the world but it is a very formidable force in itself, which India has learnt since 1947. Nepal, for a while, can learn from India’s follies in the 1962 war. It is time for a course correction in Nepal.
Atul K Thakur
Email:summertickets@gmail.com
(Published in The Kathmandu Post on July05,2013)

Borders and boundaries

The open India-Nepal border best reflects the strength of ties between these two nations but their lackluster management reveals the compromised benefits that proper handling could have achieved. With the passage of time, the 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which broadly defines bilateral strategic and trade relations between the two countries, now needs an overhaul.

The 1950 treaty mandates that “neither Government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor” and made mandatory to both sides “to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring state likely to cause any breach in friendly relations subsisting between the two Governments.”

Primarily, these accords were meant to strengthen ties between the two countries, give Nepal preferential economic treatment and provide Nepalis in India the same economic and educational opportunities as Indian citizens. Also, it ensured that the India-Nepal border would be open and people from both sides could move freely across the border without passports/visas and live and work in either country.

However, by 1978, the trade and transit treaties were separated, owing to demands from Nepal.Unfortunately, in 1988, when these treaties were up for renewal, Nepal’s less pragmatic stand to not accommodate India’s wishes on the transit treaty forced India to call for a single trade and transit treaty. Nepal maintained its firm position, which led to an unprecedented strain on India-Nepal relations.

A virtual Indian economic blockade on Nepal continued till April 1990, which was a painful episode and should be remembered as insincere political moves were made by both sides. The countries hit a new low in bilateral relations after Nepal’s arms deal with China in 1988, albeit it was later observed that economic issues were the real determinant.

Rajiv Gandhi, then Indian PM, took the matter as violation of the treaties of 1959 and 1965 but failed to understand the extraneous clout India was enjoying with these treaties. As per Gandhi, “Nepal was in India’s security zone and was prohibited from purchasing arms without India’s approval.” Such clauses were naturally unacceptable to a sovereign nation like Nepal. However, it is also true that king Birendra’s actions were focused more on irritating his Indian counterparts than going against those treaties.

Thereafter, India linked security with economic relations and took action to review India-Nepal relations. Soon, Nepal had to rethink its position after dwindling economic conditions led to a drastic change in its political system, with the effect that the king was compelled to endorse a parliamentary democracy.

As expected, the new government quickly sought to restore normal relations with India. After that, the ‘special’ security relationship between India and Nepal was reestablished during the New Delhi visit of Nepal’s newly elected Prime Minister Krishna Prasad Bhattarai in June 1990. Six months later, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala also visited Delhi and the two countries signed new, and separate, trade and transit treaties to provide more economic benefits to Nepal.

In April 1995, Prime Minister Man Mohan Adhikari visited New Delhi and negotiated well on a major review of the 1950 peace and friendship treaty. These three high-profile political visits from Kathmandu proved beneficial for India-Nepal relations. But 1996 onward, Nepal started losing its usual stream of politics under the virulent affects of an armed insurgency driven by the Maoists. The country ushered in a painful spiral of civil war with conditions becoming much grimmer with the highly suspicious royal massacre of 2001.

Gyanendra, the new king had neither the acceptance of the masses nor the capability to deal with a tricky political situation where the democratic movement was getting swiftly radicalised. In the further course of time, the Maoists made politics a popular but non-serious business through their unrelenting dubious acts. They made Nepal less progressive, going against their hyped claims, and blocked the country’s quest for better economic and diplomatic stakes in South Asia.

However, in present circumstances, a new course of action would do much good for the bilateral relations between India and Nepal and for other areas of Nepal’s interest. As prevailing strategic challenges are much bigger than in the 1950s and Nepal’s biggest quest should be to give its economy continuous momentum, the time has come when the open border must be handled more proactively to redefine trade and diplomatic cooperation between these two countries.

In particular, Nepal’s Terai region, which borders the Indian districts of north Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, could be turned into a major source of trade exchanges with India. Here, border management has to be more liberal. As someone hailing from the border regions, I have experienced the practical hurdles created by rudeness at the border check-posts. On many occasions, I have seen petty traders being exploited for no fault of their own by security personnel at the border.

Notionally, it is true that these two countries share liberal border but sadly, its entrepreneurial benefits have not reached the people living on both sides of the border. Through more progressive border plans, cluster-based trade relationships between India and Nepal could be taken ahead. This will also effectively change the pattern and outlook of bilateral relations at the macro level.

Improved trade relations would give India valid reasons for greater engagement with Nepal in developing road and rail networks along the border. A proper rail network between Madhuban-Janakpur, and a later extension to Kathmandu, will end the logistic hurdles of trade in Nepal. For decades, these small changes have been awaiting governmental action but few have their minds oriented there.Beyond the obsession with big treaties and imaginary outcomes, Nepal should pursue its relationship with India to improve its economic position.
-Atul K Thakur
Email: summertickets@gmail.com
(Published in The Kathmandu Post on May5,2013)

Remembering B P Koirala!

Bisweshwor Prasad Koirala, or BPK, was an internationalist and statesman with whom Nepal’s quest for liberal democracy began during the atrocious Rana rule. He was a maverick and never followed any existing half-baked political trend in Nepal. He embraced broader world views and kept striving to make Nepal a liberal democracy.

The monarchy was not a just ruling system for him, he maintained his struggle to replace it with democracy and succeeded to an extent in making a reasonable transition. Though things didn’t take shape ideally, once the Panchayati pattern was abolished. The other old ranks of those earlier democratic movements lost the much required vigour to carry forward desirable democratic pursuits.

BPK grew up in colonised India and shared great concern for its pathetic political status. He was a voracious reader of progressive texts and a writer of high literary sensibility. He had strong leaning towards socialistic ideas during his university days in Banaras Hindu University (BHU). He read Marx/Lenin and had taken up with the fine spirit of communist ideology.

But the personal appeal of Gandhi and the Indian Congress’ people-centric policies during the independence movement drew him closer. BHU was then a major centre of socialists in the Congress. There, he came in close contact with Acharya Narendra Dev, Ram Manohar Lohiya and Jaya Prakash Narayan.

He was sent to Indian jails on many occasions for actively speaking in favour of India’s independence from British rule. He had sensed the vitality of circumstance that could make the Ranas weaker. For this, he fought against the British. His approach broadly favoured the betterment of the entire South Asian region.

Later, as a young law practitioner, he worked for labourers in north Bihar and again spent time in jail. In those days, Indian jails were filled with high moralists. So, he was on good terms with the leading figures of Indian politics—Nehru and Rajendra Prasad, among them.

Back home during the last years of Ranas rule, he succeeded in establishing a very weak democratic system, which was working as the monarchy’s puppet. His first ministerial stint as Home Minister brought him embarrassment from various quarters, following the shooting of a few protestors by security officers in Kathmandu.

The struggle became more difficult once king Mahendra succeeded the throne in 1955. Mahendra was firm in his resolve to destroy democratic changes but BPK was not easily defeatable. By 1959, the king was forced to call a general election—this was unprecedented. The Nepali Congress won the election and BPK became Prime Minister.

But the king was wary of BP’s growing popularity at home and abroad. By the end of 1960, a coup took place (planned by the king) and BPK was sent to jail under the pressure of landed aristocrats. He was destined to struggle, but surprisingly, his brother Matrika Prasad Koirala sided with the monarchy and served as ambassador to the US. During that testing time, BPK’s personal fate was at stake but he was well connected in India and in other parts of the world.

King Mahendra knew the limit of his acts but the hardship stayed as the ‘rule of game’ against BPK and other dissenting figures. In his latter days in exile and spearheading the flame of real democracy in Nepal, BPK appeared as independent as he was always, irrespective of all pressure.

He was a tough administrator, an able diplomat and a leader who could handle adversity with courage and clear conviction. His unflinching determination for democracy did not waver with his ailing health, and hostility from king Mahendra.

Despite that, he maintained his persona and the decency of the democratic movement. His diplomatic instinct was unquestionable. He proved on many occasions that a stable leadership can rescue a nation from internal loopholes at crucial international junctures.

His refusal to VK Menon’s non-courteous demand to receive Nehru in the US, which would’ve implied that Nepal was India’s client state, could be counted as one of those astute moments. It was also not without some sound reason that he termed Nehru’s interference in Nepal’s internal affairs (beyond a point), besides the monarchy and the country’s landed aristocracy, as major hindrances for the upliftment of the country.

BPK was a respected name in India at that time, and is, even today. It was a major misfortune for Nepal that BPK couldn’t cope with his failing health and died prematurely in 1982, eight years before the country attained the remarkable landmark of a constitutional monarchy.

His younger brother, Girija Prasad Koirala, who emerged as a strong centrist and served the country many times, lacked BPK’s integrity altogether. During his time, the hope for real democracy was strengthened, albeit it proved short-lived in the course of time.

Now, with the Maoists working like monarchs, trying with all possible efforts to disfigure Nepal’s conventional outlook, it’s high time the country followed the broad path of BPK instead of getting terrorised by the current stock of dubious radicals.
-Atul K Thakur
Email:summertickets@gmail.com
(Published in The Kathmandu Post,on March31,2013)